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Purpose: The purpose of this research was to examine the 
methodological factors that judges perceive as reasons for excluding 
the expert testimony of forensic accountants in order to map this 
rationale onto the Daubert standard. 
Methodology:. A case study research design using a qualitative 
content analysis of 34 federal cases involving methodological 
violations of the Daubert standard was selected. Open and axial 
coding was applied to the judicial statements to ascertain the general 
themes as well as the specific categories that constituted those 
themes. 
Findings: Judges primarily excluded testimony based on deficiencies 
in evidence, methods, and reasoning. Deficiencies in evidence and 
method were isomorphic with the Daubert standard, whereas 
deficiencies in reasoning were unique to this analysis. Further, these 
thematic categories were interconnected in ways not explicitly 
expressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Originality/Value: This study provided a detailed understanding of 
how judges understood methodological deficiencies when applying 
the Daubert standard in order to exclude the testimony of forensic 
accountants. Practical insights on what forensic accountants should 








The role of the forensic accountant functioning as an expert witness is to provide an 
analysis of financial data to judges and juries in order that they may better 
understand the underlying nature of a potential financial crime or dispute 
(Crumbley, 2009; Manning, 2011).  The analysis should provide proof of financial 
liability or calculation of damage amounts in a lawsuit (Kranacher & Riley, 2019). 
Although the forensic accountant functioning in the capacity of an expert witness is 
tasked with applying specialized training and knowledge in order to assist the trier of 
fact, judges will often bar the testimony of FA expert witnesses in part or in whole. 
There are many reasons judges use to exclude the testimony of expert witnesses in 
general and forensic accountants specifically.  Judges will often partially exclude 
forensic accountant testimony when forensic accountants attempt to interpret the 
law, draw legal conclusions of liability and guilt, and interpret the psychological 
intentions of defendants (Crumbly & Cheng, 2014). Such actions are the proper 
domain of the courts. Also, at the state level, testimony may be excluded based on the 
Frye standard when an expert uses novel scientific techniques that have yet “to gain 
acceptance among members of the scientific community” (p. 1164, Epps & Todorow, 
2018).  
In federal courts, judges primarily use the Daubert standard to exclude expert 
testimony. The Daubert standard focuses on the qualifications of experts and their 
methodology. Although PricewaterhouseCoopers ([PWC], 2020) estimated that 
judges prefer the validity of financial expert methods of analysis and the validity of 
conclusions drawn from that analysis to be determined through the process of cross-
examination, judges are not averse to applying the Daubert standard in limine to 
exclude FA expert testimony. Indeed, out of 224 Daubert challenges in 2019, 
approximately 37% (83) resulted in partial or full exclusion of financial expert 
witnesses’ testimony.  According to DiGabriele (2020, 2011), judges are particularly 
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sensitive to bias, and forensic accountants often underestimate their level of 
objectivity.  
Daubert Standard 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court established the Daubert standard in the 
case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Jurs & DeVito, 2013). The 
Daubert standard comprises the criteria by which a judge determines whether the 
testimony proffered by an expert witness is admissible in a federal court. More 
specifically, the language of Daubert tasks the judge with determining (a) whether a 
forensic accountant is qualified, (b) whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact 
(judge and/or jury) understand a fact or issue, (c) whether the testimony is grounded 
in fact, (d) whether the testimony is based on sound scientific methods, and finally, 
(e) whether the expert has analyzed the facts using those methods correctly (Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 2007). If the expert fails to meet any one of these criteria, the 
judge may exclude some or all of the expert’s testimony. 
Judge as Gatekeeper 
The Daubert standard provides concrete guidelines that judges use to evaluate the 
admissibility of expert testimony.  Although the Daubert criteria are exact, judges still 
have some flexibility in determining the viability of testimony (Summerford, 2002). 
Daubert may specifically task a judge with determining whether the methods 
employed are based on fact, whether they are sound, and/or whether they are 
relevant, but Daubert does not task a judge with how to make those determinations.  
According to Summerford (2002), judges typically favor allowing competing methods 
to play out in court, and will often give FA’s the benefit of the doubt. Additionally, 
judges have even allowed those who were not forensic accountants or certified 
public accountants to testify as financial expert witnesses despite the fact that 
Daubert specifically tasks judges with making sure expert witnesses are qualified 
(Jurs & DeVito, 2013).  According to Digabriele (2008b, 2011), judges’ perceptions of 
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the competencies of forensic accountants functioning as expert witnesses play a 
fundamental role in determining the outcome of a case. 
Trends in Daubert Exclusions 
PWC conducted a 20-year study (2000-2019) of Daubert challenges to financial 
expert witnesses. Their analysis indicated a total of 2,842 Daubert challenges to 
financial expert witnesses for that period. The following trends were observed: 
 Reported challenges in 2019 numbered 224, which was an increase of 8% 
over the previous year. Of those 224 challenges, 83 (375) resulted in partial or 
full exclusion of the financial expert witness. 
 Over the 20-year period, the primary reason for exclusion was lack of 
reliability (529) followed by lack of relevancy (321). The third reason was 
lack of qualification (79). 
 The most commonly cited reasons for lack of reliability were insufficient data 
and faulty methods. The most commonly cited reasons pertaining to relevancy 
were experts presenting testimony beyond the scope of their expertise or 
testimony that failed to assist the trier of fact. 
 The type of finical expert seeing the highest number of challenges over the 20-
year period was economists (43%), followed by accountants (28%), a 
category with included forensic accountants. 
 Although accountants saw fewer challenges than economists, in 2019, 
accountants experienced higher exclusion rates (43% versus 31%). 
 Over the 20-year period, 67% of Daubert challenges are brought against 
plaintiff side financial experts, whereas 33% of challenges are brought against 
defendant-side finical experts. 
Statement of the Problem 
According to PCW, from 2000 to 2019, judges have excluded the testimony of 
financial experts at a rate of 33%. Meuhlman, Burnaby, and Howe (2012) determined 
the exclusion rate for forensic accountants was 46% from 1982 to 2010. The 
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exclusion rate has been determined as too high, and is particularly problematic when 
damage calculations are involved (DiGabriele, 2008a). Crumbly and Cheng (2014) 
argue that the judges have been particular open to excluding testimony since the 
advent of the Daubert Standard as Daubert includes explicit criteria for exclusion.  
From 2000 to 2019, of the 2,842 Daubert challenges brought against financial expert 
witnesses, 929 cases resulted in partial or complete exclusion (PWC, 2020). PWC 
discovered that of the primary reason for exclusion was lack of reliability (529) 
followed by lack of relevancy (321). The third reason was lack of qualifications (79). 
Reliability and relevancy are related to methodology. However, these are broad 
categories. The purpose of this research was to better understand judges’ 
perceptions of methodological deficiencies in order to develop a more detailed 
scheme of what comprises methodological categories for exclusion. Doing so will 
provide a more accurate understanding of the specific methodology related reasons 
judges use to excluded forensic accountant expert testimony. 
Fradella, O'Neill, and Fogarty (2004) discovered that judges are often hostile toward 
allowing FA expert testimony when such testimony involves calculation of damages. 
Although Meuhlman et al. (2012) indicate the 46% is too high and Fradella et al. 
(2004) describe judges as hostile to FA expert testimony regarding damage 
calculation, researchers do not identify the reasons for FA expert testimony 
disallowance.   
Defendants, including individuals and businesses that require that forensic expert 
witness testimony be effective may suffer when the FA lacks the necessary 
competencies to convince judges to hear FA testimony (DiGabriele, 2008a; Folami et 
al., 2013). In addition, judges and juries base their decisions partly on the 
information presented by FA expert witnesses (Crumbley & Cheng, 2014; Crumbley, 
Heitger, & Smith, 2005). If FA expert witness testimony is disallowed, then judges 
and juries may receive incomplete or poor information from which to make 
inferences (Crumbley et al., 2013).  By understanding judges’ perception of FAs as 
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expert witnesses as to why they disallow FA expert testimony, practitioners will 
potentially better understand how those competencies are evaluated thus potentially 
leading to improved FA testimony and potentially, an improved testimony-allowance 
rate.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to examine the methodological reasons that judges 
perceive as reasons for excluding the expert testimony of forensic accounts. The 
Daubert standard provides general criteria for excluding expert testimony. By 
examining the language judges offered in federal court when they explain their 
rationale for exclusion, we were able to map this rationale onto the Daubert 
standard. That is, themes and categories emerging from a qualitative analysis of the 
language of judges can be compared to the actual language of Daubert.  Mapping 
themes and categories that represent judicial perception onto Daubert allowed for an 
understanding of where judicial perceptions converge and where they diverge when 
compared to the Daubert criteria. 
Research Questions 
Because this study sought to discover the methodological reasons judges provided 
when excluding the testimony of forensic accountants when applying the Daubert 
standard, the following research questions were explored:   
Q1. What are the methodological reasons judges state for excluding FA 
testimony when applying the Daubert standard?  
 Q2. How are those expressed reasons conceptually and thematically 
interrelated? 
 Q3. In what way do the emerging themes correspond to the language of 
Daubert and how might they diverge, if indeed they do? 
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Research Methods and Design 
A case study research design was employed. The initial step in a case study design, 
according to Yin (2018), is to identify the case within the social context. This is 
because the context informs not only the boundaries of the case, but also many 
characteristics of the case itself. Miles and Huberman (1994) describe the case as a 
phenomenon associated with a specific context. The difference between the social 
context and the case being studied is not necessarily discrete. That is, the 
relationship between the case and the context is not always separate. For this 
research endeavor, the case was defined as the judiciary perceptions of forensic 
accountant’s methodology when they chose to exclude that testimony in part or in 
whole. The context was the defined as the court of law involving fraud cases where 
forensic accountants functioned as expert witnesses. Stake (1995) argued that the 
case should be described in terms of time and activity. Cases were analyzed from 
2003 until 2020, thus setting the time parameter, and judges’ perceptions as 
indicated by their statements were equivalent to the activity.  
Population 
The population consisted of approximately 10,000 federal and state judges in the 
United States (United States Courts, 2015). Within the population of 10,000 judges, it 
is not known how many judges have overseen cases of fraud, bankruptcy, and 
intellectual property cases, which are the kinds of cases forensic accountants 
participate in.  
Sample 
Purposive sampling, a non-randomized form of sampling, was employed. Cases were 
chosen “to make sure that specific kinds of cases of those that could possibly be 
included are part of the final sample in the research study” (Campbell et al., 2020, 
p.654). The characteristics of the case determined the selection. Consequently, the 
sampling units corresponded to legal cases involving the exclusion of expert 
testimony from forensic accountants. In addition, because the purpose of this 
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research was to analyze judges’ perceptions of methodological related reasons for 
exclusion, only cases in which judges based their exclusion on methodology were 
included in the final sample.  
Sample size was determined by saturation. Saturation, as defined by Urquhart 
(2013), occurs when no new codes arise from coding, and reiteration and 
redundancy characterize the coding process. Additionally, in alignment with criteria 
provided by Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, and Fontenot (2013), saturation was obtained 
when the coding frame remained constant and analytic memos provided no 
additional insight. 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
First, the legal case documents were prepared so that they could be entered into the 
Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT), which is a qualitative tool for coding segmented text 
data. Second a coding frame was developed from the literature, as well as the 
language of Daubert (Davis, Farrell, & Ogilby, 2010; DiGabriele, 2008a; Folami et al., 
2013; Summerford, 2002). After the data was segmented and entered into CAT, the 
data was coded and the coding frame reworked to accommodate new codes. After the 
first pass of the data was conducted, the data was recoded until no new codes 
emerged from the data. The coding allowed for both linguistic units corresponding to 
secondary and tertiary codes and more sophisticated thematic codes, which emerged 
as the primary codes (Renz, Carrington, & Badger, 2018; Schreier, 2012). Data were 
analyzed by organizing secondary and tertiary codes into primary codes and 
developing themes from those codes.   
Open and Axial Coding 
Coding was conducted using open and axial coding. After doing the open coding, the 
resultant codes were compared with each other in order to reveal the major 
categories associated with methodological reasons for exclusion. The open codes, 
which corresponded to judicial statements about methodology and exclusion of 
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testimony, were linked together in order to inform the primary themes. The open 
coding was primarily linguistic, a code representing a specific statement, whereas the 
axial codes revealed the more generalized perceptions of judges about deficiencies in 
methodology. 
Results 
Thirty-four cases involving Daubert exclusions where the judges based their 
exclusions on methodological flaws in the testimony of forensic accountants were 
analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Within those cases, 223 segments of the 
text were coded as relating to methodological flaws. Content analysis of judicial 
statements revealed nine sub-codes associated with methodological deficiencies. 
They were as follows: (a) deficient evidence, (b) deficient methods, (c) deficient 
reasoning, (d) lack of relevance, (e) faulty assumptions, (f) reference, (g) subjectivity, 
(h) standards of control, and (i) peer-reviewed status. Among these primary codes, 
(a) deficient evidence, (b) deficient methods, and (c) deficient reasoning were the 
reasons that judges cited most frequently when choosing to disallow forensic 
accountant testimony. These three primary codes corresponded to the three primary 
themes. Consequently, these codes capturing the qualitative dimensions of 
methodological competency that judges perceived that forensic accountants failed to 
display.  
Theme 1: Deficient Evidence 
The most often cited reasons judges disallowed forensic accountant testimony was 
deficient evidence. Three tertiary codes, namely insufficient data, irrelevant data, 
absence of facts, and inaccuracy comprised deficient evidence. Deficient evidence also 
displayed associations with other primary and secondary codes, including faulty 
assumptions, lack of relevance, irrelevant data, and deficient reasoning. 
Judges expressed the perceptions of deficient evidence through the tertiary codes. 
For example, some forensic accountants used irrelevant data. In the following 
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excerpt, the judge deemed the evidence to be irrelevant because the FA used data 
from a non-comparable organization. 
To the extent that the expert relied on data from larger companies that were 
not comparable and thus not relevant to the measure of lost profit damages, 
the trial court acted within its discretion to exclude the testimony because it 
was not based on matter of a type reasonably relied upon. (Sargon Enterprises, 
Inc. v. University of Southern California, 2012) 
In a different case, the judge characterizes the evidence as being insufficient.  This 
insufficiency undermined the “methods, principles, and conclusions” presented by 
the FA. Regardless of how technical or sound a methodology is, if it is not supported 
by enough evidence, the judge has a valid reason to disallow expert testimony. 
The court's view in both cases is the same: that [the FA’s] methods, principles 
and conclusions are unsupported by sufficient facts or data and are not based 
on reliable accounting methods or principles sufficient to overcome the 
Receiver's evidence that VesCor was a Ponzi scheme. (Wing v. Buchanan, 
2014) 
In addition to insufficiency, some testimony was marked by a complete absence of 
facts, as indicated by the following excerpt: “In short, it appears many of [the FA’s} 
assumptions, which constitute the bases for the conclusions she had formed by the 
time she wrote her report and sat for her deposition, are based on no evidence at all” 
(Durham v. FCA US LLC, 2019). Again, the judge typically ties deficient evidence to 
other aspects of the methodological failure. In the above case, the absence of 
evidence makes the FA’s assumptions invalid, the judge later noting that this 
ultimately does not assist the trier of fact. (Durham v. FCA US LLC, 2019) 
Another type of deficiency pertained to the accuracy of the evidence. In the following 
passage, the judge disallowed the testimony of one FA in favor of another. This is 
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because the facts on which conclusions are draw did not accurately represent 
depreciation value: 
The replacement value as stated does not include any adjustment for 
depreciation or out of service equipment that is included on [the] equipment 
list. Based on the overstatement of equipment, the Goodwill calculation is 
impacted. Therefore, the court relies on [FA2’s] forensic expert's report 
(Smith v. Smith, 2007). 
The judge disallows the first forensic accountant’s report because the facts on which 
valuation calculations were made were inaccurate. Inaccurate evidence was coded as 
a type of deficient evidence. 
Theme 2: Deficient Methods 
Thirty-six judicial statements were coded as expressing perceptions of deficient 
methods. Absence of method, unreliability, and non-specialized methods were the most 
frequent sub-codes that informed the primary code.  In the following example, the 
judge finds that simply reproducing data without analysis constitutes an absence of 
method and is thereby grounds for disallowance: 
The Court can find no accounting methodology at work in DiRuzzo's reading of 
deposition testimony and responses. With no methodology to examine and no 
accounting data to examine, the Court cannot even say “there is too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered” […] At rock bottom, 
DiRuzzo's methodology consists of regurgitating percentages printed on tax 
forms. (Arvidson v. Buchar, 2019) 
Elsewhere, the judge indicates that a market forecast cannot be based on wishful 
thinking about market share.  The particular FA’s testimony is disallowed because 
the judge perceives the method was based entirely on an assumption about market 
share and confuses assumptions about market share with market forecasting. This 
makes the market forecasting method unreliable at best: 
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 [FA’s]  Market Forecast Analysis assumes that [company number one], 
through [company number two], was expected to capture a ten-to-
fifteen-percent market share [...] Defendant writes that [FA’s] Market 
Forecast Analysis "is based solely upon the wishful thinking that 'if' 
[company number one] could achieve a percent of [company number 
three’s] business, it would be a huge success."). [Company number two] 
asserts that "[s]uch a statement cannot serve as a foundation for the 
calculation of damages" (id. at 14), and we agree  […] Contrary to this 
representation, the Market Forecast Analysis is not built on such 
projections and, absent this support, [the FA] must be precluded from 
testifying to this methodology or its implications at trial. (Washington v. 
Kellwood Co., 2015) 
This particular method, market forecasting, could not be used to predict 
market share and thus was an irrelevant and therefore unreliable method. In a 
separate case, a different judge in disallowed the FA’s testimony because it was 
fond to be unreliable: 
Moreover, [the FA] did not present any expert testimony supporting 
either his method or his resulting figure. Indeed, [the FA] testified that, 
due to the hybrid nature of [defendant’s] practice, other valuation 
methods "couldn't be used here." Thus, the trial court could properly find 
that [FA’s] suggested valuation, too, was unfounded and unreliable. 
(Court of Appeal of California, 2003) 
Yet another type of deficient method occurred when the judged deemed the 
method rudimentary to the extent that no specialized knowledge or skill would 
be required to conduct an analysis.  Judges determine whether a given method 
is a product of expert or lay analysis. That does not mean the forensic 
accountant needs to be an expert in specific fields related to the case. It does 
mean that if a non-expert can conduct the analysis, then the judge may very 
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well evaluate the method as unprofessional and requiring no special 
knowledge particular to forensic expertise. 
Schachter testified that his analysis of the market for bamboo viscose 
products consisted of his turning on his computer, visiting websites, 
reading product descriptions, comparing SKU numbers, and speaking to 
his wife and a few individuals in his office. This "analysis" is hardly the 
application of any special skills or knowledge at all, let alone the 
application of any special skills or knowledge associated with accounting 
or forensic accounting. It is an analysis that anyone with internet access 
and a high school education could have undertaken. (New Eng. 
Mercantile, LLC v. Fishers Finery, LLC, 2019) 
Theme 3: Deficient Reasoning 
Analyzing valid and sufficient evidence using scientific and expert methods is 
not always enough to guarantee the FA’s expert testimony will not be rejected.  
The third most common reason for rejecting FA testimony as it relates to 
methodology was the failure on the part of FAs to reason logically toward a 
sound conclusion. According to statements made by judges, FA testimony must 
express a coherent argument both in the FA’s report and verbally. For Case 39, 
the judge evaluated the FA’s reasoning as being “entirely circular.” (Sargon 
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 2012) 
The summary exclusion of other companies from his analysis, along 
with the fact that it should not be a startling revelation that 
biotechnology companies that have innovative products, all other things 
being equal, do better than those who do not, render this ‘driver’ equally 
meaningless for comparison purposes. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. 
University of Southern California, 2012) 
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The comparison with unlike companies led to the circular reasoning described by the 
judge. The trial judge observed that no logical comparison with similar companies 
was made, leading to merely speculative conclusions.  
Faulty assumption formed another major sub-code related to problems with deficient 
reasoning. Faulty assumption was most frequently tied to relevancy.  
[The FA] may only opine on the prudence and fairness of the sale of the stock 
executed in a SIT on December 27, 1999. His opinions based on the 
assumption that separate transactions existed are excluded for the reasons set 
forth in the Court's summary judgment order. (Hans v. Tharadlson, 2011) 
Elsewhere, the FA based his reasoning on several faulty assumptions.  
[The FA] did not provide any facts to support his assumption that these four 
games would all have sold 2.5 million copies. In making this unsupported 
assumption, he relied exclusively on another unsupported assumption, that 
Too Human would have sold 2.5 million units but for the delay. He also 
discounted SK's expected profits on each game by a percentage, in order to 
reflect the probability that the game would not be produced. Lloyd Report 29-
30. However, [FA] admitted that in assigning these probabilities, he made 
another "judgment call," and that there was a wide range of reasonable 
probabilities that he could have chosen for each game. (Silicon Knights, Inc. v. 
Epic Games, Inc., 2011). 
Theme 4: Categorical and Thematic Relations 
Axial coding revealed the interrelationships between different codes and between 
different codes and themes (figure 1). In many instances, a given sub-code was linked 
to no only the primary code that the sub-code helped define, but it was also linked to 
other sub-codes. These links were non-definitional; that is, the connection was either 
between sub-codes or when they were axially linked to a primary category or 
themes, it was primary in terms of association. For example, in Arvidson v. Buchar 
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(2019), the absence of facts and the absence of method are linked to each other in the 
judge’s perception. However, the absence of facts and the absence of method run 
parallel. Absence of method is not based on absence of facts although the 
characteristic of both types of absence is described as coeval.   
The most frequent interrelated code was faulty assumption. It was linked to a wide 
range of sub-codes, including absence of facts, insufficient data, relevance, and 
unreliability of methods. For example, in Washington v. Kellwood Co. (2015), the 
judges expresses an unreliable method as being based on a false assumption, namely, 
that market share can be determined through market forecasting.  
In Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc. (2011) the methods that the FA used rested 
on certain faulty assumptions, and although the methods and calculations may 
themselves be reasonable, if the assumptions on which those methods and 
calculation rests are not valid, then the method, no matter how reliable in-and-of-
itself, becomes irrelevant in the context of the case. Finally, insufficient evidence was 
another frequent interconnected code. Often applied methods that were based on 
insufficient evidence were perceived as deficient. Additionally, in one case, imagined 
evidence was an instance of both deficient evidence and faulty assumption (Hans v. 
Tharadlson, 2011). Finally in Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc. (2011) the 
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Analysis of the methodologically related reasons that judges excluded the testimony 
of FAs revealed the following three primary categories of exclusion: (a) deficient 
evidence, (b) deficient methods, and (c) deficient reasoning. Each of the primary 
categories was comprised of frequent sub-themes or –categories. Deficient evidence 
was most often marked by being insufficient, absent, irrelevant, or inaccurate. 
Deficient methods was primarily characterized by absence, lack of reliability, and 
being non-specialized. Deficient reasoning was indicated by unsupported 
conclusions, circular reasoning, and faulty assumptions. 
According to PWC (2020), “When excluding testimony due to a lack of reliability, 
courts most frequently cited a lack of sufficient data or the use of methods that are 
not generally accepted as reasons for exclusion” (p.5). The current research 
corroborates that insufficient data and unacceptable methods are primary reasons 
for exclusion. Such observations, however, are unfortunately too general. The current 
research suggests the lack of sufficient data and unacceptable methods are too 
generalized a description to be very useful. Content analysis of the language of judges 
reveals a more complex and nuanced perceptual dynamic for reasons of exclusion. In 
addition, problems associated with logical reasoning formed a major category of 
judicial perception. 
Furthermore, often these categories are related. For example, when describing the 
absence of methods in Arvidson versus Buchar (2019), the judge estimates that the 
regurgitation of tax percentages by the FA is not only indicative of any discernable 
method, but that no facts were analyzed as well. Although tax percentages are 
arguably evidence in the technical sense, the act of simply reproducing those facts 
without meaningful analysis rendered those facts meaningless. The judge estimated 
that the FA did not use any valid accounting data. Absence of method is thus 
associated with absence of evidence. Importantly, this case displays the link between 
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deficient evidence and deficient methods. That is, they are not necessarily 
categorically distinct. 
Elsewhere, faulty assumption appeared to intertwine with unreliability of method. 
When, in Washington versus Kellwood Co (2015), the judge perceives the method as 
unreliable, he does so due to faulty assumptions. The assumptions about a what-if 
scenario amounts to “wishful thinking” on the part of the FA (Washington v. Kellwood 
Co, 2015). In what-if scenarios, "the expert constructs a model that assumes an 
alternative reality" (Todd & Jewell, 2018, p. 307). According to Todd and Jewell 
(2018), "Sometimes the model gazes backward to predict how business would have 
performed from the moment of the unlawful act until the time of trial" (p. 307). 
According to the authors, there are three types of dubious assumptions "so severe as 
to warrant exclusion of expert damage testimony" (p. 298). They are (a) 
unreasonable comparisons, (b) unfounded simplifications, and (c) unrealistic 
scenarios. For this study, three cases fell under the category of unrealistic scenarios. 
In addition, faulty assumptions pertained to a more general category of deficiencies 
of reasoning. 
Thematic Mapping to the Daubert Standard 
There are three criteria within the Daubert standard that are arguably related to 
methodology.  They correspond to (1) whether the testimony is grounded in fact, (2) 
whether the testimony is based on sound scientific methods, and (3) whether the 
expert has analyzed the facts using those methods correctly (Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 2007). The results of this investigation suggest that Daubert exclusions 
based on methodological inadequacies, as perceived by judges, in the expert 
testimony of forensic accountants corresponded to three primary themes: (1) 
deficient evidence, (2) deficient methods, and (3) invalid reasoning. Daubert criteria 
can be directly mapped onto the first two of these three themes. 
The first methodological criteria of Daubert, namely, whether the testimony is 
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grounded in fact corresponds to theme 1, namely, deficient evidence. The second 
criteria, whether the testimony is based on sound scientific methods corresponds to 
theme 2, which is deficient methods. The final criteria, whether the expert has 
analyzed the facts using the methods correctly appears also to correspond to theme 
2. Deficient reasoning, theme 3, may or may not correspond to the second criteria. 
Insofar as invalid reasoning characterizes correct application of methods to facts, 
then perhaps it does. However, only one sub-code that informed theme 3, namely, 
conclusion unsupported by facts, appears to be related to the third criterion of 
Daubert. The other two sub-codes, circularity and faulty assumptions, really belong 
to their own category. 
Conclusion 
This research suggests that forensic accountants functioning as expert witnesses 
should be cognizant that the reasons related to methodology that judges use to 
exclude expert testimony are multifaceted.  Methodology based on exclusions 
revolved around the three central concepts of evidence, methods, and reasoning.  For 
each of those concepts, there were tendencies that the content analysis revealed, 
pinpointing the specific makeup of those concepts. Unsurprisingly, methodological 
related exclusions mapped fairly accurately onto the Daubert standard. This was 
particularly true for the concepts of evidence and methods when comparing the 
language of Daubert with the language expressed by federal judges. However, 
deficiencies in FA reasoning, which were perceived as being grounds for exclusion, 
are not specifically covered in the language of Daubert. That is, for example, Daubert 
does not specifically excluded testimony that is characterized by circular reasoning 
or is based on faulty assumptions.  
Additionally, the language provided by judges revealed more specific dimensions of 
methodological exclusion. This suggests the Daubert standard is general guideline 
and that FAs should pay particular attention to specific rationale that informs the 
concepts of evidence, methods, and reasoning. 
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For example, regarding deficient methods, FA’s should pay particular attention to 
avoiding non-specialized methods. Daubert mentions “specialized knowledge” in a 
conditional sentence, but does not explicate what specialized knowledge is (Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 2007); it only specifies that methods used should be reliable and 
applied reliably to the facts of the case. It is also crucial that FAs actually have a 
method to begin with. Simply conducting basic calculations is not enough. As 
Crumbley and Cheng (2014) state, “Accounting experts should ensure that they are 
well versed in the assumptions that comprise the theoretical model and be prepared 
to explain why these assumptions are, or are not, relevant to the test of the theory or 
the application of the theory to the case” (p. 52). 
Finally, FAs should pay close attention to the intersection of evidence, methods, and 
reasoning. This research suggests that these concepts do not function in isolation. 
Evidence, method, and reasoning are intertwined. When judges cited methods and 
being absent, for example, they often cited lack of evidence.  Additionally, deficient 
reasoning, particularly false assumptions, was associated with deficient methods or 
deficient evidence. Although the finding and s apply to U.S.-based forensic accountants 
operating in U.S. courts, these same findings may apply to international court settings where 
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